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Abstract
Over the past decade, there has been a proliferation of International Commercial Courts
(ICCs) across the globe. ICCs are specialized tribunals within the domestic court hierarchy
tailored for the adjudication of complicated cross-border commercial disputes. Most ICCs share
similar features, such as a set of flexible procedural rules comparable to those in international
arbitration, multilingual court proceedings, and the recruitment of overseas judges or foreign legal
experts.
The global phenomenon calls for a systematic comparative study of the different generations
of ICCs and their power dynamics. This Article will offer a unique typological framework to
study the evolution of ICCs. In particular, emphasis will be placed on the power dynamics among
the ICCs such as horizontal power dynamics among the ICCs inter se, and diagonal power
dynamics between the ICCs and international arbitration. This Article argues that the most apt
characterization of the two dimensions of power dynamics is “co-opetition,” a combination of
“cooperation/collaboration/complementarity” and “competition.” While a race for cases and
foreign litigants is inevitable, we argue that there is significant room for inter-regional cooperation
and coordination to allow for and capitalize on different ICC niches and specialties.
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I. I NTRODU C TIO N
Over the past decade, there has been a proliferation of International
Commercial Courts (ICCs) across the globe.1 ICCs are specialized tribunals within
the domestic court hierarchy tailored for the adjudication of complicated
cross-border commercial disputes. Most ICCs share similar features, including a
set of flexible procedural rules comparable to those used in international
arbitration, multilingual court proceedings, and the recruitment of overseas judges
or foreign legal experts. As will be seen, the comparable features can be primarily
explained by two reasons: (i) arbitralization of the judiciaries and (ii) the demand
for competitive and user-friendly service offerings provided by these specialized
courts. We shall delve into these two reasons in detail in the sections below.
The rapid global rise of ICCs is striking and stands as a game-changer in the
arena of international dispute resolution institutions. It fundamentally reshapes
the landscape of international legal adjudication by disrupting the traditional
dichotomy between international litigation and arbitration as mutually exclusive
dispute resolution service providers, and by challenging the conventional
advantage of international arbitration in handling cross-border commercial
disputes. According to the 2018 International Arbitration Survey, the major
benefits of international arbitration are the enforceability of awards under the
New York Convention, the ability to avoid national courts and local legal systems,
and flexibility.2 Most recently, ICCs have mushroomed in the regions alongside
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) such as China and Kazakhstan, as well as in the
post-Brexit European Continent.3 The top-down approach in the establishment
of ICCs in the jurisdictions of these regions also reflects their geopolitical
aspirations to rise as legal hubs and important international commercial law
centers.
The global phenomenon calls for a systematic comparative study of the
different types and features of ICCs and their power dynamics. In this respect,
there has been a growing literature on the study of ICCs that focuses on their: (i)
1

2

3

For statistics, please refer to Table 1 infra, which shows a surge in ICCs since 2015. See also Matthew
S. Erie, The New Legal Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 60
VA. J. INT’L L. 225 (2020); Janet Walker, Specialized International Courts: Keeping Arbitration on Top of Its
Game, 85 ARB. 2 (2019); Gary Bell, The New International Commercial Courts – Competing with Arbitration?
The Example of the Singapore International Commercial Court, 11 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 193 (2018);
Xandra Kramer & John Sorabji, International Business Courts in Europe and Beyond: A Global Competition
for Justice?, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 1, 1–9 (2019); S.I. Strong, International Commercial Courts and the United
States: An Outlier by Choice and by Constitutional Design?, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COURTS: A
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Xandra Kramer & John Sorabji eds., 2019).
See generally Paul Friedland & Stavros Brekoulakis, 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution
of International Arbitration, QUEEN MARY U. LOND. AND WHITE & CASE (2018),
https://perma.cc/AN9P-8R4S.
See Erie, supra note 1, at 227, 294.
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socio-historical origins, 4 (ii) international functions and utility, 5 and (iii)
establishment.6 However, there is a significant literature gap in the sense that the
existing literature fails to take into account the dynamic interaction between ICCs
and between ICCs and international arbitration. As a result of this gap, the
literature underestimates the rising global proliferation and influence of ICCs and
carries a presupposition of the dominant role of arbitration in international
adjudication. In other words, ICCs—which form an indispensable part of
international adjudication and global dispute resolution—are being
underestimated by policy makers and legal scholars alike. This Article serves as a
reality check and a timely reminder that ICCs, and their related governance and
legitimacy issues, need to be attended to in order to depict a full picture of global
adjudication in the twenty-first century.
In addition to building upon existing scholarship, this Article will offer a
unique typological framework to study the global rise of ICCs. In particular, this
Article will emphasize the power dynamics among the global ICCs, such as
horizontal power dynamics among the ICCs inter se and diagonal power dynamics
between the ICCs and international arbitration. This Article argues that the most
apt characterization of the two dimensions of power dynamics is one of
“co-opetition,” a combination of “cooperation/collaboration/complementarity”
and “competition,” a notion borrowed from the study of International Financial
Centres (IFCs) and New Legal Hubs (NLHs).7 While a race for cases and foreign
litigants is inevitable, we argue that there is significant room for inter-regional
cooperation and coordination to allow for and capitalize on different ICC niches
and specialties.
This Article proceeds as follows. Section II studies the global rise of the
ICCs and creates a new typology to classify different ICCs worldwide. In doing
so, we propose a new typology that takes into account ICCs’ socio-historical
origins, the process of their establishment, jurisdictional coverage, and, most
importantly, the politico-economic incentives behind their establishment. This
Article then groups them into three generations: ICCs 1.0, ICCs 2.0, and ICCs
3.0. Section III then conducts a systematic and in-depth comparative study of the
three types/generations of the global ICCs. Section IV examines the power
dynamics associated with the existing ICCs. The issue of “competition” or
“cooperation/collaboration/complementarity” can be viewed both horizontally
4
5

6

7

Id.
See Pamela K. Bookman, The Adjudication Business, 45 YALE J. INT’L L. 227 (2020); Walker, supra note
1; Bell, supra note 1.
See Sheng Zhang, China’s International Commercial Court: Background, Obstacles and the Road Ahead, 11 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 150 (2020).
See, e.g., Douglas W. Arner et al., Assessing Hong Kong as an International Financial Centre (Univ. H.K.
Faculty
of
L.
Rsch.
Paper
No.
2014/012,
2014),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2427609.
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and diagonally. The horizontal view concerns the power dynamics among the
three generations of ICCs inter se. The diagonal view of the global rise of ICCs
highlights the relationship between transnational litigation and international
arbitration. Conventional discourse often refers to the two as opposite and
competing service providers engaged in a “race to the top” in the adjudication
business.8 Section V concludes that the “arbitralization” of judiciaries as a new
trend of the transnational legal order has emerged and is evident in the ICC
evolution. A majority of ICCs have incorporated elements of arbitration and
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) elements into their court procedures to
attract adjudication business. Although it is difficult to estimate the precise impact
of ICCs on the transnational legal order given that many have been established
only recently, the issues of governance, legitimacy, and norm-creation by ICCs
will have far-reaching impacts in international law.

II. T Y P OLOGY
A. Global Picture
Typology is defined as the “ordering of entities into groups of classes on the
basis of their similarity.”9 The approach is to “minimize within-group variance”
such that each group internally is as “homogeneous as possible.”10
The typology of ICCs can be established in accordance with the following
non-exhaustive list of independent variables: (i) establishment history, (ii)
establishment region/jurisdiction, (iii) legal origin (common law/civil law), (iv)
court infrastructure, (v) judge capacity-building and recruitment of foreign
judicial/legal expertise, (vi) procedural design (including language of proceedings),
(vii) governing law, and (viii) caseload.11 We start by providing an overview of the
global picture of the existing ICCs.
Currently, there are thirteen major or significant ICCs established around
the world.12 This number does not include the Brussels International Business
Court (BIBC), which was proposed in 2020 but abandoned in 2021, as discussed
in Section III. An overview of the geographical distribution and the year of
establishment of the thirteen ICCs is illustrated in Table 1 below.

8
9

10
11
12

Bookman, supra note 5, at 231.
Cesare P.R. Romano, A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT
241, 243 (2011); KENNETH BAILEY, TYPOLOGIES AND TAXONOMIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CLASSIFICATION TECHNIQUES 1 (1994).
Romano, supra note 9, at 243.
See Zhang, supra note 6, at 150–74, 153.
See Stephan Wilske, International Commercial Courts and Arbitration — Alternatives, Substitutes or Trojan
Horse?, 11 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 153, 172 (2018).
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As shown in the table above, there has been a global emergence of ICCs
over the past decade, with eleven new additions since 2010. Regarding their
geographical distribution, ICCs are scattered across the globe, including in Europe,
North America, the Middle East, and Asia.
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The emergence of ICCs worldwide has prompted scholars to look into the
relationship between ICCs and international arbitration.13 The orthodox account
assumes a competition for forum selection clauses in commercial contracts,
creating a race-to-the-top drive for optimizing procedural rules and efficiency.14
In 2015, a report published by the U.K. Ministry of Justice implied the
competition view by noting the “increasing competition in the international
dispute resolution market with other jurisdictions marketing themselves to attract
disputes traditionally adjudicated in London.”15 The 2015 U.K. Ministry of Justice
Report aims to understand what drives litigants to initiate commercial litigation
and choose particular fora for their litigation.16
Upon closer examination, ICCs are region-centric niche courts equipped
with optimized procedural rules with specific geopolitical focuses. Rather than
treating ICCs and international arbitration as “competitors” or “substitutes”
within a unified supply market, 17 this Article argues that each ICC offers
“complementary” services specifically catered for their target businesses in
different markets. This “complementary view” will become apparent following
our global survey of ICCs in Section II below.

B. Various Approaches
In order to systematically analyze the global rise of ICCs, this Article creates
a new typology for categorizing them worldwide by building on existing
scholarship in the field. In the following paragraphs, we present our original
typology, which contributes to the scholarly understanding of the power dynamics
of ICCs.
One school of scholarship has focused on the degree to which individual
ICCs are affiliated with the English legal system and, hence, has categorized ICCs
as (i) “traditional,” (ii) “transplant,” or (iii) “hybrid.”18 This categorization has
focused on the extent to which an ICC incorporates the features of a traditional
English court. In a way, this typology could be traced back to the legal origins
theory proposed by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei

13

See, e.g., Michael Hwang, Commercial Courts and International Arbitration—Competitors or Partners?, 31
ARB. INT’L 193 (2015); Bookman, supra note 5.

14

See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 (2016).
EVA LEIN ET AL., FACTORS INFLUENCING INTERNATIONAL LITIGANTS’ DECISIONS TO BRING
COMMERCIAL CLAIMS TO THE LONDON BASED COURTS 3 (2015), https://perma.cc/469B-23Z8.
See id. at 1.
See Wilske, supra note 12, at 182.
Christopher Bisping, International Commercial Courts and the Dominance of English Law,
Seminar at University of Hong Kong (Sept. 25, 2019) (unpublished presentation) (on file with
author).

15

16
17
18
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Shleifer (“LLS”) in the World Bank Doing Business initiative.18 In the LLS legal
origins school, the central claim is that the English common law system is
generally hospitable for advanced financial markets and is conducive to economic
development.19 Similarly, there have been attempts to evaluate the new ICCs by
benchmarking them against the London Commercial Court (LCC) in London and
the English legal system, which has dominated the ICC market for a long period
of time.20 ICCs were essentially divided into either benchmark common law ICCs
(the LCC in the U.K.), or various “runner-up” ICCs, including the Singapore
International Commercial Court (SICC) in Singapore and the Dubai International
Financial Centre Court (DIFC Court) and Qatar International Court and Dispute
Resolution Centre (QIC) in the Middle East.21 Based on this school of thought,
the “transplant” and “hybrid” ICCs naturally flow from the common law. As such,
a “traditional” ICC would use the common law system and the English language
in the ICC while maintaining the domestic legal system. A “transplant” ICC would
introduce some common law features in ICC proceedings but with its own
modifications, such as the use of its own language.22 A “hybrid” ICC, on the other
hand, would include features of arbitration in addition to the traditional court rules.
While this method of categorization can capture some features of different ICCs
in the world, particularly their resemblance to the LCC, it fails to discern the
deeper differences between ICCs. It follows that this categorization may become
an Anglo-centric model for the purpose of comparison. For instance, the ICCs in
the U.K. and Singapore both adopt the common law system and the English
language directly and are thus “traditional” ICCs. However, there are significant
differences between the two, as the subsequent analyses show. For example, the
SICC uses International Judges, whereas the LCC consists solely of domestic
English judges. Moreover, the LLS school excludes the Commercial Division of
the New York State Supreme Court (NYCD) in the U.S. and the recently
established China International Commercial Court (CICC) in China from its
typology.
Another school of scholarship was coined by Pamela Bookman, under which
ICCs are split into three categories: (i) “old-school international commercial
courts” such as the LCC and the NYCD; (ii) “investment-minded courts” such as
18

See generally Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285
(2008).

19

See John Ohnesorge, Legal Origins and the Tasks of Corporate Law in Economic Development: A Preliminary
Exploration, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1619 (2009).
See Erie, supra note 1; Walker, supra note 1; Bell, supra note 1.
See Wilske, supra note 12, at 160.
While Christopher Bisping, supra note 18, did not point out specific examples of “hybrid courts,”
the ICCP in Paris and FRC in Germany may potentially qualify as candidates for this category, given
their flexibility in opting for common law-based English law, while at the same time retaining their
domestic judges (nationality requirement). See infra Table 4.

20
21
22
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the QIC and the DIFC Court in the Middle East; and (iii) “aspiring legal hubs,”
which are subdivided into the SICC and the European Courts. 23 Bookman’s
typology is distinguished from the legal origins approach because it takes into
account the economic and political motivations which underlie the establishment
of ICCs. Under this categorization, the CICC established by China was separately
discussed and was not included within any of the above categories. While this
typology has the benefit of considering the underlying motivations of various
ICCs, the scope of “legal hubs” (category (iii)) is vaguely defined. Arguably, the
QIC and the DIFC Court can also be categorized as aspiring legal hubs, given
their status as jurisdictional carve-outs in the U.A.E. This unique status surmounts
the pre-existing legal restraints in the Middle East Islamic law that may not be
favorable to trade and commerce (for example, the legal prohibition against riba
(interest charged on loans)).24 Moreover, such classification ultimately boils down
to the question of what qualifies a legal hub, which is an elusive concept largely
driven by the state’s marketing or image work.
Zhang adopted a different approach by classifying ICCs in accordance with
the legislative arrangements that empowered their establishment. 25 The first
category consists of the SICC and the Kazakhstan Astana International Financial
Centre Court (AIFC Court), which were established via constitutional
amendments.26 The second category consists of ICCs in Germany, France, the
Netherlands, and Belgium (the latter of which the proposed court has been
abandoned, see Section III below), which were established via amendments to the
host states’ domestic laws. These courts are situated within their respective
domestic legal systems. The third category comprises the CICC, the DIFC Court,
the QIC, and the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) Court. The third category
is an intermediate category, as these courts have their own independent legal and
regulatory framework (as in the second category) but were not established by
constitutional amendment.
Drawing from the above literature, we distinguish this Article from the
existing scholarship and propose a new typology for classifying different ICCs
worldwide. First, as observed by Tom Ginsburg, the missing key word in the
analysis of legal institutions in economic development is “politics.”27 In his article,
23
24

25
26

27

Bookman, supra note 5.
See Hesham M. Sharawy, Understanding the Islamic Prohibition of Interest: A Guide to Aid Economic
Cooperation Between the Islamic and Western Worlds, 29 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 161 (2000).
See Zhang, supra note 6, at 153.
See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (AMENDMENT) ACT NO. 39 OF 2014;
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN ON THE ASTANA INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL CENTRE, Constitutional Statute No. 438-V ZRK of 7 Dec. 2015, amended 30 Dec.
2019.
Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV.
829, 842 (2000).
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Ginsburg revisits the relationship between law and economics, observing the
tension between the traditional assumption of the centrality of formal, rational law
and the empirical evidence in Asia.28 As observed in the Law and Development
Movement, the causal relationship between law, development, and politics is
multidirectional.29 Max Weber and Douglass North proposed a neoclassical or
“New Institutional Economics” (NIE) model of causation between law and
development, concluding that a formal, rational legal system is a necessary
condition for economic development.30 Such a causal link is severely challenged,
however. A close examination of the empirical experience in East Asian
economies would reveal that a robust legal system may not be a necessary
condition for economic growth. 31 Expanding on Ginsburg’s conclusion, we
submit that the underlying geopolitical and economic motivations behind the
emergence of international legal infrastructure should be the primary focus of ICC
typology.
Given the above premises, we propose that the new typology shall take into
account three main factors: (i) the evolution (in other words, establishment history
and geographical location) of ICCs; (ii) the politico-economic motives behind the
establishment of ICCs; and (iii) the newer features of ICCs that make them as
welcoming and effective as international arbitration. Inspired by
Menkel-Meadow’s work on the evolution of dispute resolution, 32 ICCs are
classified into three generations: (i) ICCs 1.0, which includes ICCs in “established
jurisdictions;” (ii) ICCs 2.0, which largely cover ICCs in “emerging jurisdictions;”
and (iii) ICCs 3.0, which consist of those ICCs with geopolitical-economic
motivations. This model of typology, which highlights the waves of ICC evolution,
is based on scholarship by Janet Walker,33 Gary Bell,34 and Matthew Erie,35 who
approached ICCs by their socio-historical origins and legal origins. It also builds
on the work of Pamela Bookman,36 Stephan Wilske,37 and Sheng Zhang,38 who
28

See id. at 830.

29

37

See id. at 842.
See Max Joite, The China Problem and the England Problem: Counterexamples to Law and Development Theories
of Douglass C North and Max Weber, 11 H.K. J. L. STUD. 143 (2017).
See Ohnesorge, supra note 19; Harold J. Berman, Some False Premises of Max Weber’s Sociology of Law,
65 WASH. U. L. Q. 758, 759 (1987).
See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mediation 3.0: Merging the Old and the New, ASIAN J. MEDIATION
1 (2018). The author reviews the world history of mediation and classifies mediation into mediation
1.0, mediation 2.0, and mediation 3.0.
See generally Walker, supra note 1.
See generally Bell, supra note 1.
See generally Erie, supra note 1.
See generally Bookman, supra note 5.
See generally Wilske, supra note 12.

38

See generally Zhang, supra note 6.

30

31

32

33
34
35
36
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examined ICCs by looking into the underlying motives driving their establishment
to assess their specific geopolitical and economic considerations.
This Article presents a novel and unique typology, which clarifies and aids
scholarly understanding of the power dynamics of ICCs—namely, a
three-generation typology of ICCs.
The first generation of ICCs is grouped as ICCs 1.0, which refers to those
traditional ICC giants in “established jurisdictions.” These jurisdictions are global
dispute resolution fora seeking to maintain their dominance in the transnational
litigation market. The LCC in London and NYCD in New York are
long-established, well-recognized, and world-renowned ICCs with a high volume
of international cases and high-quality judgments that are cited around the world.39
ICCs 2.0 alludes to the second wave/generation of ICCs established in
“emerging jurisdictions,” which aim to enter the adjudication business market,
often with a specific geographical focus. Examples of the ICCs in this group
include the SICC in Singapore; the DIFC Court, QIC, and ADGM Court in the
Middle East; and the AIFC in Kazakhstan.
Third-generation ICCs, which are grouped as ICCs 3.0, are characterized by
their strong politico-economic motivations. This category refers to specialized
commercial courts triggered by specific politico-economic incidents and aims.
They can be broadly sub-categorized into (i) post-Brexit European courts40 and (ii)
the Belt and Road Court—specifically, the CICC established by China.
Moreover, we observe that ICCs have all evolved to become more
comparable to international arbitration. ICCs are increasingly “arbitralized” by
allowing ICCs to assume jurisdiction over disputes without any link to the home
country of the ICC (as is the case in the SICC).41 Many ICCs also allow judges
with foreign and international law expertise to sit on the bench,42 which parallels
the ability to pick arbitrators with specific expertise. The ICCs 2.0 and 3.0 have
39
40

41

42

See generally Bell, supra note 1; Erie, supra note 1; Walker, supra note 1.
Category (i) of ICCs 3.0 includes but is not limited to: the International and European Commercial
Chamber of the Paris Court (ICCP), the Chamber for International Commercial Disputes of the
Frankfurt Regional Court (FRC), the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC), and the failed Brussels
International Business Court (BIBC). See Bookman, supra note 5, at 231. Note that Bookman’s
analysis rejected the proposition that competition is the sole driving force behind the creation of
European ICCs. Instead, Bookman argued that the establishment of ICCs in Europe and beyond
is also a result of particular domestic political economies and other forces. Some courts (e.g.
Amsterdam) emerge as aspiring litigation hubs without an emphasis on arbitration and without an
ambition to overtake London as the prime destination for holistic dispute resolution services.
Others (Kazakhstan, Qatar, etc.) seek to attract foreign capital and investment, rather than seeking
to establish themselves as legal hubs. Bookman emphasized the relationship between domestic and
international driving forces, rather than the Brexit factor. Id. at 230.
See Man Yip, The Resolution of Disputes Before the Singapore International Commercial Court, 65 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 439 (2016).
For a list, including the SICC, DIFC Court, QIC, ADGM Court, see infra Table 3.
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significantly enhanced their competitive edge by setting themselves up to attract
the widest range of disputes possible.
It is noteworthy that the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (HKCFA) has
been classified as an ICC in work by Matthew Erie and Janet Walker.43 This may
be attributed to the fact that these articles classifying the HKCFA as an ICC
focused on the “New Legal Hubs” (as in Erie’s analysis) or “specialized
commercial courts” (as in Walker’s analysis) rather than ICCs per se.44 While the
HKCFA consists of an international bench with non-permanent judges from
overseas common law jurisdictions, for present purposes, the HKCFA is not
included as an ICC for two reasons. First, it is not a specialized court or division
solely dedicated to the adjudication of commercial cases with an international
nature. The HKCFA, apart from commercial cases, also hears criminal,
constitutional, and administrative cases. This is distinguished from specialized
ICCs such as the SICC in Singapore, which is a division of the Singapore High
Court (subordinate to the Court of Appeal) and only hears international
commercial cases.45 Second, the HKCFA does not act as a court of first instance.
As entrenched in Article 82 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (the Basic Law), the HKCFA is the final appellate court
vested with the power of final adjudication.46 This contrasts with the SICC, which
takes on first-instance cases either from parties’ agreement, by virtue of their
jurisdictional clause, or by case transfers from the Singapore High Court. 47 The
key difference is that the HKCFA is not subject to further appeals. In contrast, a
judgment from the SICC is subject to appeals to the Court of Appeal of the
Singapore Supreme Court.

III. T HRE E G E NE RATIONS OF ICC S
Before delving into the analyses of the global ICCs 1.0 to 3.0, for purposes
of the comparative study, we list various features of the ICC landscape that allow
for a comparison of the efficacy of the various ICCs. These features include
establishment history, region/jurisdiction, legal origin (common law/civil law),
court infrastructure, judges (number, domestic, foreign), procedural design,
governing law, and caseload distribution.

43
44
45

46
47

See Walker, supra note 1, at 4. See also Erie, supra note 1.
Id .
For a clear illustration of the SICC and its associated hierarchy, see SING. INT’L COM. CT., Overview
of the SICC (2021) https://perma.cc/2MGB-UX5L.
Xianggang Jiben Fa, art. 82 (HK).
See Man Yip, Singapore International Commercial Court: A New Model for Transnational Commercial
Litigation, 32 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L. L. & AFF. 155, 165 (2015).
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A. ICCs 1.0: Established Jurisdictions
Both the U.K. (London) and the U.S. (New York) are well-regarded as
traditional and established common law jurisdictions. ICCs in both jurisdictions
are, in fact, separate domestic courts or divisions within their ordinary judicial
systems.

1. London Commercial Court (LCC)
The LCC was established in 1895 as a subdivision of the Queen’s Bench
Division of the English Court, one of the three divisions of the English High
Court, alongside the Chancery Division and the Family Division.48 Within the
Queen’s Bench Division, there are specialist courts, including the Administrative
Court (which hears applications for judicial reviews), the Business and Property
Court, and the Technology and Construction Court.49 Since 2017, the LCC has
been incorporated as part of the Business and Property Court, with a “Financial
List” dedicated to high-value complex commercial cases.50 The LCC, currently
consisting of thirteen English judges who are empowered to sit for both the
Admiralty Court and the Commercial Court, hears all commercial disputes and
acts as a supervisory court for international arbitration. 51 The LCC primarily
accepts cases if the parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the English courts
by a choice of forum clause.52 Other bases of jurisdiction include: (i) the defendant
being domiciled in England; and (ii) for claims with multiple defendants, one
defendant being an “anchor defendant” subject to English jurisdiction, through
which the plaintiff obtains permission to sue any other “necessary or proper
party” to that claim. 53 LCC’s internationality is highlighted by its party
composition, with 77% of its cases in 2019 involving at least one foreign party
and 43% solely involving foreign parties.54 As recorded in the latest Portland’s
Annual Commercial Courts Report, which analyzes judgments from the LCC to
identify notable trends such as the nationality and background of the users of the
48

49
50

51

52

53
54

See JUDICIARY OF ENG. AND WALES, THE QUEEN’S BENCH GUIDE 2021 12–13 (2021),
https://perma.cc/9SDQ-65MQ.
Id.
See Bell, supra note 1, at 195; Pierre Berger & Michael Huertas, The Belgian Solution to a Brexit Dispute
Resolution Problem: Say Hello to the Brussels International Business Court, 3 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG.
25, 26 (2018).
See HM CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERV., Admiralty and Commercial Court Judges (2015),
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/admiralty-and-commercial-court-judges (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
This is one of the jurisdictional routes set out in the case of Tugushev v. Orlov [2019] EWHC 645
(Comm).
Id. at 42.
THECITYUK, LEGAL EXCELLENCE, INTERNATIONALLY RENOWNED: UK LEGAL SERVICES 2020 7
(2020), https://perma.cc/EH2K-QDYA; RICHARD FENTIMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION [1.19] (2d. ed. 2010).

Winter 2022

455

Chicago Journal of International Law

court and the drivers behind the use of LCC, litigants in the LCC in 2021 came
from over seventy-five countries. 55 The LCC has a remarkable caseload, with
1,476 hearings listed and 1,013 claims heard in 2020.56
The reasons for the LCC’s success are manifold.57 First, the U.K.’s common
law makes the LCC attractive to litigants. English law is regarded as the “go-to”
legal framework for international commerce. 58 According to Walker, the LCC
becomes an ICC not by optimizing its procedural rules, but by setting itself out as
a model for transnational commercial litigation.59 This is particularly true when
transnational commercial parties do not have a satisfactory judicial system in their
home jurisdictions.60 Similarly, a survey by the European Parliament revealed that
English law is the leader in Europe’s litigation market.61 Second, the availability of
international interlocutory remedies under the English common law, such as
anti-suit injunctions and worldwide asset-freezing injunctions, provides extra
protection to foreign litigants.62 Third, the LCC’s use of English, a global lingua
franca, in its court proceedings further consolidates its dominant position. Fourth,
the LCC is a century old. Its first-mover status gives it another advantage over all
other ICCs. The flip side of that coin, however, may be that the newer ICCs can
be more flexible in creating unique and innovative court proceedings (for example,
the introduction of foreign judges or use of UNCITRAL Model Law) to attract
the market share from the LCC.
The strength of the LCC is not limited to its institutional excellence. Its
primacy is also extended by its close proximity and historical connection with the
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) and the London Maritime
Arbitration Association (LMAA), over whose arbitral awards it exercises
supervisory jurisdiction.63 The availability of both quality litigation and arbitration
for cross-border disputes in the same location creates an “agglomeration effect.”
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PORTLAND,
COMMERCIAL
COURTS
REPORT
2021
1,
https://portlandcommunications.com/publications/commercial-courts-report-2021/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2021).
THECITYUK, supra note 54, at 27; JUDICIARY OF ENG. AND WALES, THE COMMERCIAL COURT
REPORT 2017-2018 (INCLUDING THE ADMIRALTY COURT REPORT) 10 (2018),
https://perma.cc/23YY-SUUC.
See generally Christopher Bisping, Associate Professor of Law, International Commercial Courts and
the Dominance of English Law (Feb. 25, 2019) (unpublished presentation) (on file with author).
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Zain Al Abdin Sharar & Mohammed Al Khylaifi, The Courts in Qatar Financial Centre and Dubai
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See Walker, supra note 1, at 3.
See LEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 15.
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The same effect is found in other prominent legal hubs, such as Singapore.64 Such
agglomeration minimizes transaction costs and facilitates efficient dispute
resolution.65
However, the LCC faces considerable challenges in the present-day. First,
the LCC has increasingly fierce competition from other ICCs. In particular, the
U.K. Ministry of Justice’s report highlighted the ICCs of New York, Singapore,
and the European Union as key competitors of the LCC.66
Apart from that fierce competition, the LCC’s leading position is further
undermined by the uncertainty caused by Brexit. A 2018 report by the European
Parliament suggested that, after Brexit, commercial parties might be forced to
consider alternatives to the LCC. 67 Indeed, the Portland Commercial Courts
Report 2021 confirms that prediction, showing that the proportion of LCC
litigants from EU member states declined from 14.9% in 2016–17 to only 11.5%
in 2020–21. Given that the U.K. will be precluded from relying on the Brussels
Regime, a mutual judicial recognition and enforcement regime inter se the EU
member states, the enforceability of judgments rendered by the English courts in
EU member states will be in doubt going forward. 68 However, an English
judgment with valid choice-of-court agreements may arguably be enforced in EU
member states via the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court
Agreements (“Hague Convention”) given that the U.K. is still a signatory to the
Hague Convention. In any event, the significant level of uncertainty as to the
impact of Brexit on the LCC could possibly compromise its core values of
predictability and legal certainty. Indeed, as will be explained in Section II.C below,
the uncertainty surrounding Brexit has prompted the proliferation of ICCs on the
European continent, including the establishment of the ICCP, the Netherlands
Commercial Court (NCC), and the abandoned BIBC, all of which capitalized on
this opportunity to compete with their London counterpart.69

2. The Commercial Division of the New York Supreme Court
(NYCD)
The New York Supreme Court established the Commercial Division,
dedicated to adjudicating complex commercial disputes, in 1995, in reaction to its

68

See Erie, supra note 4, at 15. See also MICHAEL STORPER, THE REGIONAL WORLD: TERRITORIAL
DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 54 (1997). For example, Singapore is the home of the
SICC, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), and the Singapore International
Mediation Centre (SIMC).
See Erie, supra note 1, at 13, 30.
See LEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 36.
See Rühl, supra note 61, at 33.
See Wilske, supra note 12, at 161.
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See id. at 182.
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loss of “adjudication business” to international arbitration and to the Delaware
courts. 70 The jurisdiction of the NYCD is limited to high-value commercial
disputes, with a current monetary threshold of $500,000 (exclusive of punitive
damages, interests, costs, disbursements, and counsel fees).71 For foreign cases
with little or no connection to New York, the only requirements to establish
jurisdiction before the NYCD are showing that: (i) the value of the dispute
exceeds $1 million and (ii) there is a choice-of-forum clause whereby the parties
agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of the New York State.72
The NYCD covers a wide range of commercial cases, including land and
conveyances, professional negligence (to a certain extent), and insolvency cases.73
It also aims to attract transnational commercial parties by producing high-quality
judgments74 with cultivating the perception of having lower litigation costs.75 The
NYCD also benefits from the economic power of the U.S. by attracting domestic
parties and parties with assets in the U.S. At the same time, the NYCD has
increasingly incorporated ADR elements within its conventional court
procedures. For example, in 2019, it amended its Rule 3(a).76 Under the new rule,
the NYCD may “direct . . . the appointment of an uncompensated mediator for
the purpose of mediating a resolution of all or some of the issues presented in the
litigation” if the presiding justice finds that “it would be in the interest of the
[case’s] just and efficient processing.”77 This mediation service is free of charge
for the first three hours of the session.78 Additionally, the NYCD’s “Mandatory
Mediation Pilot Project,” introduced from 2014 to 2016, refers “every fifth
Commercial Division case” to the ADR Program for mandatory mediation
sessions. According to an Administrative Order from January 28, 2016, this pilot

70

See Bookman, supra note 5, at 237.

71

See 22 NYCRR § 202.70(a).
See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1402. See also Bookman, supra note 5, at 237.
The range of commercial cases dealt with by the NYCD includes breach of contract or fiduciary
duty, transactions involving commercial real property, legal malpractice arising out of representation
in commercial matters, and dissolution of corporations.
See Walker, supra note 1, at 5 n.13.
See LEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 27.
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See Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts on the Amendment of
Rule 3(a) of section 202.70(g) of the Uniform Rules for the Supreme and County Courts (Rules of
Practice for the Commercial Division), AO/399/18 (Dec. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/X7X66VYA.
22 NYCRR § 202.70.3(a); Rule 3 of the Rules and Procedures of the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Program, Comm. Div. of the N.Y. County Sup. Ct., https://perma.cc/4WG9-KAG5.
Rule 7 of the Rules and Procedures of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, Comm. Div.
of the N.Y. County Sup. Ct., https://perma.cc/4WG9-KAG5.
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program was positively received, showing the success of integrating ADR
elements with traditional court procedures to form a “one-stop” legal hub.79

3. Findings on ICCs 1.0
A comparative study of the LCC and the NYCD elucidates their differences.
The NYCD focuses more on the domestic litigation market. As the leading forum
of commercial dispute resolution within the U.S., 80 the NYCD attracts a
significant amount of litigation of all types, but most suits come from U.S.
parties.81 Some have suggested that the NYCD has limited incentives to attract
foreign parties because of New York State’s limited resources for subsidizing the
judiciary.82 This observation may betray a deeper underlying difference between
the LCC and the NYCD: while the LCC is a court established within its country’s
domestic legal system, the NYCD does not benefit from internal referral routes
that operate among different U.S. state courts within the U.S. legal system.
There are, however, some commonalities between the LCC and the NYCD.
For one, they are both located in “go-to” common law jurisdictions, which have
well-established legal systems and rule-of-law traditions. Not surprisingly, at an
institutional level, the infrastructures of the LCC and NYCD are both largely
similar to the domestic courts of their respective jurisdictions. Additionally, even
though both the LCC and NYCD are governed by local laws on jurisdiction, a
choice-of-forum clause would be sufficient to establish their jurisdiction in these
disputes.
Currently, although both the LCC and NYCD have enjoyed a relatively
strong reputation in the international dispute resolution market, they are also
facing increasing competition and challenges from other ICCs. As a result, there
is a need for the ICCs 1.0 to consolidate their comparative advantages by keeping
their dominant market positions. On the other hand, there may be limited room
for improvements of the ICCs 1.0. Their reputations may preclude change.
Because these ICCs rely on the inherent renown of their respective domestic legal
systems, it would be difficult to make major structural reforms to them. Moreover,
change may be restricted by the administrative limitations of their respective
countries’ domestic courts, such as rules against the use of foreign judges. 83
79

Administrative Order of the Administrative Judge for Civil Matters, AO-ADR22016 (NY Sup. Ct.
Jan. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/455N-Z4YR.
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One further commonality among the ICCs 1.0 is their use of only domestic
judges. Under the British judicial system, judicial appointments are only open to
citizens of the U.K., the Republic of Ireland, or a Commonwealth country. 84
Similarly, the composition of the NYCD is subject to the U.S. citizenship
requirement for appointing judicial officers under U.S. law.85 The lack of foreign
judges, however, does not seem to impede the development of these ICCs 1.0.86
Both the LCC and the NYCD are embedded within their domestic judicial
systems, and there is no standalone legislative framework governing the
composition of judges and jurisdiction. These structural ties to the domestic
judicial system would also imply that both the LCC and the NYCD are governed
by their respective domestic jurisdictional limits.
This feature is in stark contrast with the substantial inclusion of foreign
judges in ICCs 2.0 in emerging jurisdictions. The inclusion of foreign judges from
well-established jurisdictions can boost the legitimacy and quality of the dispute
resolution reputation of emerging jurisdictions. Table 2 below wraps up the
important comparative features of the ICCs 1.0.

84
85

86

requirements on nationality: only citizens of the U.K., the Republic of Ireland or a Commonwealth
country, including dual nationals, are eligible to be appointed as a British judge); Tom Dannenbaum,
Nationality and the International Judge: The Nationalist Presumption Governing the International Judiciary and
Why It Must Be Reversed, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 77 (2012).
See Rab, supra note 83.
See Citizenship Requirements for Employment in the Judiciary, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS.,
https://perma.cc/AU5H-JJUQ.
See generally HE QISHENG (何其生), GUOJI SHANGSHI FAYUAN YANJIU (国际商事法院研究)
[RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COURTS] (2019).
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B. ICCs 2.0: Emerging Jurisdictions
Since 2006, there has been a wave of creation of new ICCs in emerging
jurisdictions in the Middle East and Asia. These ICCs are markedly different from
the ICCs 1.0, notably as to their use of a combination of domestic and
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international judges, their unique legal status within “jurisdictional carve-outs,”
and their drastically different methods of and motives for attracting foreign
investment.

1. The Middle East ICCs
There are three notable ICCs in the Middle East: the DIFC Court in Dubai
(established in 2006), the QIC in Qatar (established in 2010), and the ADGMC in
Abu Dhabi (established in 2015). Comparative studies show that these three
Middle East ICCs share a number of similar features.
These three ICCs all adopt a common law approach. 87 In terms of
jurisdiction, they all deal with civil and commercial cases involving their respective
Middle East regions.88
These courts all consist of a combination of domestic and foreign judges.
The DIFC Court currently has thirteen judges: five domestic judges from the
U.A.E., four judges from the U.K., three judges from Australia, and one judge
from Malaysia.89 The QIC, similarly, has two domestic Qatari judges and eleven
foreign judges, from countries like the U.K., Singapore, New Zealand, South
Africa, and Cyprus.90 The ADGMC’s eight-judge bench is entirely composed of
foreign judges from the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand.91 The chief judges of
all three courts are currently foreign judges: the DIFC Court’s Chief Justice is
former Chief Justice of Malaysia Zaki Azmi, the President of the QIC is former
Chief Justice of England and Wales Lord Thomas, and the ADGMC’s Chief
Justice is former Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the U.K. Lord Hope.
All of these courts are situated in “exceptional zones”: economic zones in
the Middle East that have substantially different legal systems from the countries
in which they are located and thus are treated as “jurisdictional carve-outs.” While
Islamic law is practiced in the countries in which they are located, the special
economic zones adopt a distinctly Western legal system. One difference between
Islamic law and English common law is Islamic law’s prohibition against riba, a
form of interest charged on loans, which may deter foreign investment as it is not
on par with international commercial practice. 92 For example, the ADGM has
specific legislation, the Application of English Law Regulations 2015, that governs
the region.93 These Middle Eastern economic zones were set up, to promote trade
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

See Erie, supra note 1, at 268.
See Bookman, supra note 5, at 240–46.
Judges, DIFC COURTS, https://perma.cc/Q678-RL2Y.
The Court Overview, QATAR INT’L CT. & DISP. RES. CTR., https://perma.cc/E7Y4-RJ6F.
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See Sharawy, supra note 24, at 161.
See ADGM, APPLICATION OF ENGLISH LAW REGULATIONS 2015 (Mar. 3, 2015),
https://perma.cc/L6MC-XQ6C. Bookman, supra note 5, at 240–46.
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and attract foreign investment.94 The predominant motive of the three ICCs is to
serve their respective economic zones. As admitted by the Chief Executive and
Registrar of the DIFC Court in a 2018 speech, “the driving force has not been
competition between courts for cases, but rather competition between countries
for investment.”95 This is a fundamentally different motive when compared with
ICCs 1.0, whose main aim is to consolidate and enlarge their share in the global
litigation market. The Middle East ICCs, on the other hand, were established to
boost the confidence of foreign investors, thus promoting business for their
particular economic zones.
The phenomenon of establishing ICCs in “exceptional zones” or
“jurisdictional carve-outs” is shared among various emerging economies. Matthew
Erie observed that exceptional zones, including special economic zones (SEZs)
(for example, Shenzhen in China), free trade zones (FTZs) (for example, Shanghai
Free Trade Zone in China), often overlap with emerging legal hubs such as the
DIFC in Dubai and CICC in Shenzhen. It was further suggested that the
exceptional zones may potentially lead to “jurisdictional turf wars” with their host
states given their fundamentally different legal origins and jurisprudential basis.96
Erie further suggested that from a wider anthropological perspective, such conflict
can possibly produce ideological dissonance. For example, it was observed that
the domestic courts in Dubai voiced discontent over the idea of “conduit
jurisdiction” of the DIFC Court, arguing that its jurisdiction was unduly
expanded.97 As a compromise, a Joint Tribunal consisting of both domestic judges
and judges from the DIFC Court was established in 2016 to adjudicate on cases
of jurisdictional conflicts. Similarly, the proposal for establishing the BIBC in the
European Continent encountered fierce pushback from the local judiciary. For
example, when the Belgian Federal Government submitted the BIBC Bill, the
High Council of Justice issued an open letter criticizing the “English-speaking
court project” (le projet de tribunal anglophone) with criticisms surrounding the BIBC’s
impact on domestic courts, its impartiality, and source of funding.98
The Middle East ICCs use common methods of and have similar motives in
attracting investors. First, they are heavily built on the basis of the U.K. legal
system. All three courts draw foreign judges predominantly from common law
jurisdictions, and both the QIC and ADGMC are led by former senior justices of
94
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the British supreme court levels. In light of the popularity of the English common
law in resolving transnational commercial disputes, it is clear that the Middle East
ICCs hope to attract investors by introducing the common law system. 99 As
Michael Hwang (former Chief Justice of the DIFC Court) vividly put, the DIFC
Court is a “common law island in a civil law ocean,” given that the U.A.E. laws
are primarily based upon the civil law tradition.100 This is a particularly bold and
innovative move, given that the domestic law systems of the countries in which
the Middle East ICCs sit are significantly different from the English common law.
Second, both the DIFC Court and QIC incorporate substantial ADR
elements into the formal court proceedings. The QIC provides that judges can be
separately appointed as arbitrators and administer arbitrations if the QIC is chosen
as an arbitral seat. 101 The DIFC Court has gone even further, providing a
mechanism for creditors to convert a monetary judgment rendered by the DIFC
into an arbitral award via the DIFC’s collaboration with the London Court of
International Arbitration (LCIA).102 In this way, the converted award will become
an LCIA award that is globally enforceable under the New York Convention. 103
The process of converting a DIFC Court judgment to an LCIA award is as
follows:
(i) The parties submit to the jurisdiction of the DIFC Court by a jurisdiction
agreement together with an arbitration agreement requiring the Referral
Criteria to be satisfied.
(ii) The Referral Criteria includes an enforcement dispute between a
judgment creditor and judgment debtor with respect to money claimed
as due under a judgment.
(iii) A judgment creditor can refer the “enforcement dispute” to the
DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre for obtaining a possible arbitral award.104

This unusual feature of converting DIFC Court judgments into arbitral
awards is presumably because the U.A.E. is not yet a signatory to the Hague
Convention. The Hague Convention enables mobility of judgments from courts
of nations that are signatories to the Convention, thus facilitating global
movement of judgments. Nevertheless, the DIFC Court judgments are
enforceable in the Gulf Region by virtue of the Gulf Cooperation Council
99
100
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103
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Convention for the Execution of Judgments, Delegations and Judicial
Notifications.105
The DIFC Court has the highest volume of cases among the three ICCs in
the Middle East. According to recent statistics, the DIFC Court had fifty-four first
instance cases recorded in 2017, followed by QIC with sixteen cases and ADGMC
with thirteen cases.106 The success of the DIFC Court seems to derive both from
the quality of its bench and decisions and the innovation of converting DIFC
judgments into LCIA arbitral awards.

2. Astana International Financial Centre Court in Kazakhstan (AIFC)
While Astana (renamed as Nur-Sultan in 2019), Kazakhstan, is located in
Central Asia, the AIFC is similar to the Middle East ICCs. Like the Middle East
ICCs, the AIFC sits within a special economic zone and borrows heavily from the
U.K. common law system.107 In addition, the AIFC is guided by other common
law jurisdictions, which makes the AIFC more connected with common law
jurisprudence around the world.108
Erie pointed out that the AIFC is not entirely a replica of the DIFC Court
model. On the one hand, the AIFC does not serve as a conduit jurisdiction and
hence avoids the encroachment of jurisdiction concern from the domestic courts
as in Dubai’s case.109 As seen from the Dubai experience, the DIFC Court once
positioned itself as a “conduit jurisdiction,” under which litigants may seek to
enforce a foreign judgment in the onshore Dubai courts via the DIFC conversion
mechanism even if there is no connection between the foreign judgment and the
DIFC Court.110 Such a “short-cut” enforcement path was the subject of criticism
because it may bypass the local Dubai courts and may constitute an encroachment
upon the jurisdiction of the onshore Dubai courts. This sentiment also led to
pushback from the Joint Tribunal of the Dubai Courts and the DIFC, which ruled
that the onshore Dubai courts shall have the prevailing jurisdiction over the DIFC
on parallel proceedings.111 By contrast, the AIFC adopted the “opt-in” model, a
jurisdiction based on the free election of parties.112 On the other hand, the AIFC
105
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See Erie, supra note 1, at 271.
Joseph Chedrawe, Enforcing Foreign Judgments in the UAE: The Uncertain Future of the DIFC Courts as a
Conduit Jurisdiction, 11 DISP. RES. INT’L 133, 136 (2017).
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does not form part of the judicial system of Kazakhstan. It is an independent court
within the AIFC economic zone.113
The AIFC also has arguably greater ambitions than do the Middle East ICCs.
While the latter focus on parties from the Gulf region, the AIFC targets parties
across the Eurasian region.114 This is a much larger geographical reach than the
AIFC economic zone per se. One possible explanation for the AIFC’s ambition
may be the unique geographical location of Kazakhstan. Notably, the AIFC’s
target region is likely to overlap with China’s BRI and may potentially compete
with the CICC in the BRI litigation landscape. In fact, the Kazakhstan government
has launched the “Nurly Zhol,” a national infrastructure development initiative
focused on transforming Kazakhstan into a major Eurasian hub by developing
and modernizing roads, railways and ports in Kazakhstan.115 Given the significant
geographical and political overlap, this would make the AIFC a potential
competitor with the CICC.
With respect to jurisdiction, the AIFC accepts disputes that involve
interpretation of the AIFC Acts, between AIFC participants, on operations within
or regulated by the AIFC, and by parties’ agreement.116 It currently has eleven
judges who are all from the U.K., with former Deputy President of the Supreme
Court of the U.K., Lord Mance, as its Chief Justice.117 The AIFC law is guided by
common law principles, and parties may agree on applicable law so long as such
law does not contradict the Kazakhstan public policy.118

3. Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC)
The SICC, established in Singapore in 2015, is arguably the most competitive
among the ICC 2.0 group. It is considered a key competitor with the LCC, as
identified by the U.K. Ministry of Justice in a 2015 report.119 This is a remarkable
achievement, given that Singapore’s legal history is much shorter compared to that
of the U.K. and, likewise, the SICC vis-à-vis the LCC. As a common law
jurisdiction in Asia, Singapore is also much smaller than the U.K. in terms of
geographical size and population. Singapore is also less established in terms of its
volume of cases and jurisprudential development.
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An important distinguishing factor of the SICC lies in its wider target market.
Unlike other ICC 2.0 group courts that focus on facilitating the development of a
particular economic zone (for example, the DIFC, QIC, and AIFC ) the SICC
aims to promote the entire country of Singapore in terms of transnational dispute
resolution services for international users.120 One of the major aims of the SICC
is to develop “a freestanding body of international commercial law” for the
international audience.121 As such, while the majority of claims in the Middle East
ICCs involve Middle Eastern clients, the SICC serves clients from around the
world and focuses primarily on international disputes.122
Another key feature is the strong support from the host state, as the SICC
has strong government backing. The idea of establishing the SICC can be traced
back to the Opening of Legal Year 2013 where Chief Justice of Singapore
Sundaresh Menon shared his vision for the creation of an SICC that would expand
the internationalization and export of Singaporean law. 123 Shortly after, the Chief
Justice and the Minister of Law, K. Shanmugam, announced that an SICC
Committee would be created to study the viability of the establishment of the
SICC.124 In the model of the SICC, there has been a close collaboration between
government department/ministers and the judiciary in the policy-making of
judicial capacity-building. This echoes Erie’s remarks that the government plays a
central role in most of the NLHs by having controlling stakes in the “corporate
entities” of the dispute resolution services.125
It has been suggested that the SICC’s success can be attributed to its
reputable and internationally diverse bench and its flexible procedural rules.126 The
procedural rules of the SICC are strongly influenced by the arbitration procedural
model, triumphing party autonomy. A typical example is that the “open court”
presumption can be overridden by parties’ agreement or by parties’ application to
the court for a confidentiality order.127 In other words, the SICC will take a more
liberal approach in dealing with international commercial disputes than do the
domestic courts.128 These strengths can be summarized by the delicate balance
120
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between borrowing from the traditional English common law system and making
innovations distinct from other ICCs. Moreover, Singapore’s top-down ambition
in constructing a suite of premium dispute resolution services has been shown in
the agglomeration of the SICC, SIAC, and the SIMC (together, the
SICC-SIAC-SIMC).129 In 2010, the Maxwell Chambers was set up in Singapore to
accommodate the SIAC and the SIMC, an arrangement which facilitates
“one-stop-shop” dispute resolution services for international users and minimizes
costs through cross-institutional cooperation.
Structurally, the SICC is a subdivision of the Singapore High Court, which
is part of the Supreme Court of Singapore, and designed to deal with transnational
commercial disputes.130 In terms of its jurisdiction, the SICC has the power to
hear cases if the dispute is of an international and commercial nature and parties
have directly submitted to the SICC jurisdiction under a written jurisdiction
agreement.131 There is no requirement that the case has an actual connection with
Singapore. The choice of the SICC in the jurisdictional agreement as the only
connecting factor would suffice.132 Moreover, the SICC has jurisdiction to hear
cases transferred directly from the Singapore High Court, which means the SICC
has a stable intake of cases in addition to the cases submitted via parties’
jurisdiction agreements.133 Hence, its caseload is guaranteed. The intake of cases
from internal referral resembles the LCC, which is a division of the English High
Court, whereas the case intake via the parties’ jurisdiction clauses mirrors
international arbitration. This “party opt-in” feature, without the need to establish
any link to Singapore, makes the SICC a “hybrid” court offering complementary
services between traditional court proceedings and international arbitration, which
significantly enhances its competitiveness and is unparalleled among the ICC 2.0s.
Apart from guaranteed caseload, the cost of proceedings in the SICC is
reasonable. The current daily rates for a single-judge-bench and a
three-judge-bench for trial at the SICC are fixed at SG$3,500 and $10,500,
respectively.134 The clear rules for fees, charges, and the reasonable costs set out
in the Singapore Rules of Court provide predictability for businesses to conduct

129
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131
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See Man Yip, The Singapore International Commercial Court: The Future of Litigation?, 12 ERASMUS L. REV.
82, 83 (2019).
See Bookman, supra note 5, at 247.
See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, Rules of Court, ch. 322, § 80, Order 110, Rule 7 (2014) (Sing.)
[hereinafter SGJA Rule 7].
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See Bookman, supra note 5, at 248.
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proceedings in the SICC. This can be contrasted with the concern voiced over the
cost and time spent in international arbitration.135
There are currently sixteen International Judges sitting on the SICC bench
in addition to the eighteen domestic Singapore High Court judges.136 Different
from other ICCs 2.0 courts, which draw overseas judges exclusively from
common law jurisdictions (predominantly the U.K.), the SICC draws judges not
just from a broader group of common law jurisdictions (the U.K., the U.S.,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Hong Kong), but also leading civil law
jurisdictions (such as France).137 The SICC draws from a wide pool of judicial
talents from both the East and the West.138 Arguably, the judicial profile is more
internationally diverse and boasts expertise across a broader range of legal systems
and culture as compared to both the ICCs 1.0 and other ICCs 2.0 counterparts.
As the latest statistics show, thirty cases were decided at the SICC in 2020.139 The
total decided caseload at the SICC has reached ninety-five since its establishment
in 2015.140 Notably, there has been an increase in the SICC caseload in 2020, which
can be contrasted to the LCC (an example of an ICC 1.0) which saw a decrease in
its usual case volume.141

4. Findings on ICCs 2.0
ICCs 2.0 are established to serve the economic interest of a particular
country or an economic zone, with three salient features as follows. First, a
common feature of these economic zones is their aim to increase parties’
confidence and improve the quality of the court’s decisions and to attract foreign
investment and commercial parties by borrowing features from ICCs 1.0 (i.e., the
common law system). Second, while ICCs 2.0 look to ICCs 1.0 for guidance, the
former have more innovative features. For example, although the home countries
for many ICCs 2.0 do not have common law legal systems, some of them have
carved out areas of common law with constitutional amendments or regulatory
changes. This is unparalleled among ICCs 1.0, which established themselves as
domestic courts embedded within their own national legal systems. Third, a
considerable number of foreign judges (especially from common law jurisdictions)
135

Friedland & Brekoulakis, supra note 2. As shown in the 2018 Queen Mary Survey, 67% of the
respondents indicated that “cost” is the “worst characteristic” of international arbitration. Id.
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with International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 115 AJIL UNBOUND 5, 9 (2021).
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are introduced to the ICCs 2.0. In addition, the SICC in Singapore has stood out
among the ICCs 2.0 as an unconventional, hybrid court model by offering
complementary services between traditional court proceedings and international
arbitration. The SICC is an integral part of the Singapore High Court—its mother
court—and can hear cases directly transferred from its mother court. This intake
of cases from internal referral has inspired the CICC in China to be affiliated with
the Chinese Supreme People’s Court, which will be analyzed in the ICCs 3.0
group. Moreover, ICCs 2.0 have evolved in the direction of being comparable to
international arbitration. This is particularly evident in the case study of the SICC.
Singapore allows the SICC to assume jurisdiction over disputes without any link
to Singapore and then relies on the Hague Convention to facilitate global
judgment mobility to mirror what the New York Convention does for global
enforcement of arbitral awards.142 In addition, Singapore allows for judges with
foreign and international law expertise of both common law and civil law
backgrounds, which parallels the ability to pick arbitrators with the most suitable
expertise, an example of the evolution of ICCs 2.0 to become increasingly
internationalized and competitive to attract the widest range of disputes possible.
This evolutionary trend of amassing newer features of international arbitration
and increasing comparability to international arbitration service providers is also
evident in the wave of the ICCs 3.0.
Table 3 summarizes the comparative features of the ICCs 2.0.

142

Friedland & Brekoulakis, supra note 2.
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C. ICCs 3.0: Regional and Geopolitical -Economic ICCs
Recent changes in the world’s political and economic trends have prompted
the proliferation of ICCs 3.0, with different underlying regional politico-economic
motivations. The home states of these ICCs are neither traditional common law
jurisdictions nor emerging niche jurisdiction carve-outs. In fact, the rise of ICCs
3.0 is in response to specific regional geopolitical-economic incidents: Brexit and
the Belt and Road Initiative. In this respect, ICCs 2.0 and 3.0 may have a certain
degree of overlap as they both aspire to boost the economic and/or legal
development of their host states. One way to further distinguish ICCs 2.0 and 3.0
is that ICCs 2.0 show evident features of common law “transplant” in emerging
jurisdictions such as Singapore and Abu Dhabi, with prominent English judges as
judges for SICC and ADCC and common law as their default governing law. By
contrast, ICCs 3.0 consist of jurisdictions that are rooted in civil law traditions,
such as France, Germany, Belgium, and China, and are generally less receptive to
the influence of foreign law. As such, ICCs 3.0 distinguish themselves from the
“transplant” regimes of the ICCs 2.0 in locations such as Singapore, Qatar, Dubai,
and Abu Dhabi which are heavily influenced by English common law.

1. European ICCs
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium all established their own
ICCs soon after the U.K.’s decision to withdraw from the European Union,
commonly known as Brexit. The proliferation of ICCs in the European Continent
reflects the European states’ ambition to draw dispute-resolution business from
the LCC in London.143 In fact, the European Parliament published a report in
2018 to consider how member states’ dispute resolution mechanisms can be
strengthened in light of Brexit.144 One key finding is that the LCC would lose the
advantage of judicial cooperation among EU courts—such as the reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of monetary judgments—forcing commercial
parties to consider alternatives to the LCC.145
To compete with the LCC, these European ICCs incorporate several
common law elements. The most notable feature is the use of English in court
proceedings. For example, the NCC in Amsterdam adopts English as the language
for court proceedings and final judgments. 146 The NCC also allows for the
possibility of choice of foreign law, including English law). 147 These features
specifically cater to English-speaking commercial parties, and the NCC prides
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itself as an “English-language environment within a civil law jurisdiction.” 148
However, these European ICCs are less willing to fully embrace the common law
system and English language in their domestic jurisdictions than ICCs 2.0 are,
given their deeply entrenched civil law tradition. For example, the general rule at
the ICCP in Paris is that both the written submissions and court judgments must
be made in French, although parties can produce oral submissions and expert
evidence in English.149 The FRC in Frankfurt likewise prescribes that German
must be the language of the court proceeding due to restrictions under § 184 of
the German Courts Constitution Acts (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz or GVG).150 This
sheds light on the role of legal tradition and culture in the establishment of ICCs.
A comparative study of these continental European ICCs shows that the
proposed but abandoned BIBC in Brussels would have been the most distinctive.
While the German, French, and Dutch ICCs stand as specialist chambers within
domestic court systems, 151 the BIBC would have been a standalone court
independent from its local judiciary. The BIBC aimed to bring litigation and
arbitration closer together. For instance, its procedural rules would have mimicked
the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Model Law). 152
Specifically, the BIBC planned to adopt Article 28 of the UNCITRAL Model Law,
which essentially follows the “free choice model.”153 Furthermore, the BIBC cases
would have been heard by both professional judges and international business law
specialists.154
All these features are borrowed from arbitration. Despite its innovative
institutional breakthrough, the draft bill faced fierce pushback from the Belgian
domestic judiciary (High Counsel of Justice), which primarily questioned the
feasibility of its “two-tiered justice,” the source of funding, and its impact on
domestic courts. 155 Other controversial issues related to the BIBC proposal
include the language of proceedings and the perceived over-reliance on procedural
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https://perma.cc/2DK6-VLXB. See also Bookman, supra note 5, at 251.
See Bookman, supra note 5, at 254.
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Jane Y. Willems, Party Autonomy and the Selection of Non-State Norms in International Commercial Contracts,
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law based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. 156 This, coupled with a changing
political climate in Belgium, led Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel to quietly
withdraw the draft BIBC bill.157 As of October 2021, Belgian scholar Stefaan Voet
observes there is little appetite in the current Belgian government to resuscitate
the bill. 158 However, despite the BIBC’s failure, it still serves as an important
inflection point for ICCs based on two grounds. First, the draft BIBC serves as a
model for ICCs that can be replicated in some capacity in the future. BIBC’s
proposed design to adopt the UNICTRAL Model Law as the procedural
framework reflects the most recent and forthcoming interface between ICCs and
international arbitration. This wave of “arbitralization” of ICCs is highlighted in
Section IV.C below. 159 Second, the demise of the BIBC proposal further
entrenches the importance of having top-down government backing. One crucial
factor behind the abandonment of the BIBC was the lack of government support,
coupled with the pushback from its local judiciary. 160 For any future ICC
developments, a key lesson from the BIBC case study is that having government
backing is a necessary condition, if not a precondition. For example, such
top-down support was well demonstrated in the success of the SICC.161
With respect to jurisdiction, the ICCP in Paris accepts transnational
commercial disputes that are related to international commercial contracts,
transportation, unfair competition, and other financial transactions.162 There is no
requirement for a connection with the host state, France. As long as there is (i)
parties’ consent via a choice of court agreement electing the Paris Court of Appeal
as the designated court and (ii) the case has an element of international business,
the ICCP may have jurisdiction.163 However, the parties cannot explicitly opt for
ICCP as the forum because all cases need to first pass through the Placement
Chamber, which is a special chamber within the Paris Court of Appeal responsible
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for allocating disputes to different divisions of the same. 164 The Placement
Chamber is similar to the role of a traffic controller.
In Germany, the FRC at Frankfurt hears disputes that satisfy the following
requirements: (i) it is a “commercial matter” within the meaning of § 95 of the
German Act on the Constitution of Courts (GVG); (ii) it is international; (iii) it
does not fall under the special jurisdiction of another chamber of the Regional
Court of Frankfurt; and (iv) the parties had a choice of court agreement and had
declared that they wanted to plead in the oral proceedings in English and waived
the right for an interpreter.165 As to the NCC in Amsterdam, it does not require
any connection to the Netherlands as long as parties agree to the NCC’s
jurisdiction.166 The approach taken by the FRC and NCC is similar to that of the
SICC, in which the only connection required is the parties’ choice of court
agreement. 167 In November 2020, the Stuttgart Commercial Court (SCC) and
Mannheim Commercial Court (MCC) were established as specialist commercial
divisions of the Regional Courts pursuant to § 95 of the GVG.168 Both the SCC
and MCC hear complex commercial disputes of at least €2 million at stake.169 One
key feature of the two courts is that parties are entitled to opt for an adjudication
panel with one regular judge and two lay commercial judges who are experienced
businessmen.170 The participation of lay judges is intended to inject commercial
expertise from the business sector into the judicial bench, thereby enhancing
public confidence in the German court system.171 Similar to the ICCP, the SCC
permits proceedings to be conducted in English, as all regular judges on the SCC
bench possess English language proficiency.172 Parties may appeal to the Courts
of Appeals of Stuttgart and Karlsruhe.173
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The proposed BIBC in Belgium would have been the most “liberal regime,”
and the jurisdiction of the BIBC would have gone further than all the
aforementioned Continental European ICCs. As stipulated in Art. 576/1(2) of the
Belgian Judicial Code,174 the BIBC would have had jurisdiction via one of two
routes: (i) through a choice of court agreement submitted to the BIBC; or (ii)
through a referral by another Belgian, foreign, or international court or tribunal,
including an arbitral tribunal, in which the parties’ consent to the referral is
declared. 175 As such, in addition to the conventional first route where parties
submit directly to the BIBC via a choice of court agreement, there would have
been a second unconventional route of referrals from foreign courts, or even
arbitral tribunals, so long as the parties consented to the referral order made by
these external tribunals. It is the “referral” route that would have distinguished the
BIBC from the NCC/FRC/SICC’s “choice of court agreement as a sole
connection” feature. In other words, the “pre-concluded” choice of court
agreement could be substituted with parties’ consent to the declaration of referral
by a foreign court or an arbitral tribunal at a “post-commencement” stage.176
This would have been by far the most liberal regime in terms of the
jurisdiction of the existing ICCs. A post-commencement consent to the referral
declaration by any foreign court or an arbitral tribunal would have also given rise
to the BIBC’s jurisdiction. This feature is distinguishable from the regime under
the FRC, the NCC, and the SICC on the grounds that the latter ICCs do not allow
a referral route via external tribunals (judicial or arbitral). For example, the SICC
only provides for an internal referral mechanism from the Singapore High Court
to the SICC or by parties’ choice of court agreement.177
As for governing law, all ICCs 3.0 use their own domestic law subject to
parties’ intentions otherwise. For example, the ICCP and the NCC both allow
parties to select foreign law.178 As mentioned, the proposed BIBC would have
been the most innovative court on the issue of governing law because of its plan
to adopt the UNICTRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as
its procedural rules.179
European ICCs take varied approaches to the backgrounds they require of
their judges. There is no foreign judge available in the NCC, though Dutch judges
174
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are believed to have good command of English.180 In Paris, the ICCP is staffed
with French judges who can speak English and have English common law
reasoning capabilities.181 The design of the FRC bench in Frankfurt is markedly
different from those of the NCC and ICCP. Each FRC bench sits three domestic
German judges: one professional judge and two lay business experts.182 Among
the European ICCs, the BIBC panel composition would have been the most
intriguing. It was to be composed of (i) a Chairman, who is a professional judge
from the Brussels Court of Appeal Market Court, (ii) a Panel Chairman, who is
also a Belgian professional judge with knowledge in international trade law, and
(iii) BIBC Judges, who are lay judges chosen from a list of international trade law
specialists from Belgium and beyond.183 For (iii), there was no requirement that
the judge be Belgian or a European citizen, nor was Dutch or French language
proficiency needed. Thus, non-European judges could have been appointed to the
list of eligible lay judges. However, since the list of lay judges would have been
nominated by the Belgian business sector under Articles 202, 204, and 216 of the
Belgian Judicial Code, it remains uncertain to what extent the BIBC judges would
have featured non-European businessmen.184
The intra-regional competition among the European ICCs may improve the
competitiveness of each individual ICC, as each of them has sought to develop its
own niche by creating user-friendly court features (for example, language or use
of international judges) and delivering quality judgments. 185 Nonetheless, there
may be conflict and overlap between these courts. As a result, their
competitiveness against the LCC, a single court within a coordinated common law
legal system, might be hindered. In light of this potential conflict, there have been
calls for a combined and consolidated European Commercial Court (ECC).186 It
is believed that such an ECC would benefit from a truly neutral and international
nature, which would give it more flexibility in terms of appointing international
judges and allow it to compete directly with other regional ICCs. 187 However,
there have not yet been any concrete plans taken by the European Union in this
direction. It is possible that such plans will not emerge anytime soon, given the
recency of the emergence of the European ICCs.
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2. China International Commercial Court (CICC)
While Europe has been occupied with Brexit and its aftermath, China has
been rolling out its ambitious economic and diplomatic plan, the BRI. The BRI
ambitiously aspires to expand regional markets and facilitate economic integration
across Asia, Africa, and Europe.188 It has been regarded as a game-changer in the
landscape of dispute resolution and is expected to trigger a proliferation of
adjudication business.189
The CICC was established in 2018 to cater to China’s leading role in the BRI,
with the specific goal of facilitating dispute resolution among BRI countries. 190
The CICC is governed by the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on
Several Issues Regarding the Establishment of the International Commercial
Court (CICC Provisions).191 It consists of two courts: the First CICC in Shenzhen,
Guangdong Province, for handling BRI-related international commercial disputes
arising out of the sea-based Maritime Silk Road; and the Second CICC in Xi’an,
Shaanxi Province, for handling BRI-related international commercial disputes
arising out of the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt.192 Shenzhen was chosen
for its traditional role as a test bed of new legal and economic policies and for
being closer to the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Great Bay Area. Xi’an was
chosen in part for its historical position as the starting point of the ancient Silk
Road.193 Meanwhile, the Fourth Civil Division of China’s Supreme People’s Court
(SPC) in Beijing, which specializes in trials of international commercial disputes
in China, is responsible for coordinating and guiding the two CICCs.194
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As of February 2021, all sixteen judges appointed to the CICC are mainland
Chinese, selected from senior judges familiar with international laws and norms
and proficient in English and Chinese; nine out of the sixteen judges either visited
or studied at a university outside mainland China.195 The introduction of foreign
judges has been prohibited by Chinese law (for example, Art. 12 of China’s Judges
Law stipulates that a judge in China must be of Chinese nationality).196 Faced with
this obstacle, the CICC innovatively introduced international expertise through its
niche product, the International Commercial Expert Committee (the ICE
Committee).197
There are three major provisions in the establishment of the ICE
Committee: (i) the CICC Provisions, (ii) the Working Rules of the ICE
Committee,198 and (iii) Procedural Rules for the CICC of the Supreme People’s
Court (For Trial Implementation).199 Article 11 of the CICC Provisions provides
that an ICE Committee is established to create a “one-stop” international
commercial dispute resolution mechanism at the CICC.200 As set out in Article 3
of the Working Rules of the ICE Committee of the SPC, members of the ICE
Committee may have two key duties: (i) to preside over mediations and (ii) to
provide expert opinions on findings of foreign law.201 The mediation duty of the
ICE Committee is an integral part of the CICC’s ambition to set up a “One-Stop
Multi-tier Dispute Resolution Platform,” as prescribed by Article 11 of the CICC
Provisions, “with the promotion of arb-med as one of its top priorities.”202 The
most notable of the many ground-breaking features of the ICE Committee is that
if a settlement agreement has been reached after the presiding of mediations by
the ICE members, the CICC may issue a judgment based on the mediation
settlement agreement.203 In this way, the foreign members of the ICE Committee
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are indirectly allowed to pass “judgments” via the mediation mechanism. 204 This
is by far the most liberal feature of the CICC in terms of internationalization and
may potentially somewhat offset the international concerns about and scepticism
of its lack of international elements (particularly on foreign judges).
Apart from encouraging parties to settle their disputes, the CICC also allows
the ICE Committee to give advice on foreign law. Another statutory obstacle is
Article 262 of the 2017 Chinese Civil Procedure Law, which stipulates that
hearings of foreign-related cases must be in the language commonly used in China
(for example, Chinese Putonghua).205 The extent of the CICC’s introduction of
international elements stops at the ICE Committee. This may affect the CICC’s
competitiveness when all other ICCs in Asia and along the BRI roadmap feature
foreign judges (such as the SICC in Singapore, AIFC in Kazakhstan, and ICCs in
the Middle East). With a limited degree of internationalization, the CICC may not
attract as many international parties as its peers. In the long-term, it is proposed
that judicial reforms would be carried out to introduce elements of internationality
into both the CICC bench and legal representation by revising Article 9 of the
Chinese Judges Law and Article 262 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law.206
Despite the CICC’s potential limitations, the court could benefit from the
BRI directly. Commercial parties in BRI-related contracts, influenced by China’s
economic power, may specifically designate the CICC for dispute resolution.
However, it is unclear whether this will be a commercially sound and sustainable
practice for the CICC. On the other hand, mirroring the SICC’s placement as a
subdivision of the Singapore High Court, the CICC was made a subdivision of
the SPC in Beijing, a structure that guarantees a healthy flow of cases by transfers
and referrals.207 Thus, the CICC, like the SICC, should have a stable intake of cases
in addition to cases directly submitted by parties’ jurisdiction agreements.
There are three features of the CICC that deserve particular attention. First,
the ICE Committee’s function as a mediator and a foreign law expert is no doubt
a sign of internationalization by the CICC. The fact that the mediation settlement
agreements can be converted into the CICC judgments is arguably in parallel with
the DIFC Court’s innovation to convert judgments into arbitral awards.
Second, the CICC actively embraces the concept of a “one-stop” center for
multi-tiered approaches to international commercial dispute resolution services,
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integrating litigation, arbitration, and mediation.208 The notion of a one-stop-shop
echoes the multi-door courthouse envisioned by the late Harvard professor Frank
Sander, who envisaged that future courts should provide a menu of options for
dispute resolution back in the 1970s. 209 A concrete example is that the CICC
Procedural Rules provide for pre-trial mediation procedures upon the plaintiff’s
consent.210
Last but not least, the CICC strives to achieve technological innovation. As
stipulated in Article 4 of the CICC Procedural Rules, the Court supports an online
process for case acceptance, payment, service of process, mediation, file
inspection, evidence exchange, pre-trial preparation, and hearings. 211 The case
management and pre-trial conferences can be held via online video calls.212 The
parties may also apply for an online video trial.213 In a recent visit to the Singapore
Maxwell Chambers, which houses the SIAC and the SIMC, Erie observed that the
Chinese delegates actively asked questions regarding the role of technology in
ADR proceedings when interacting with the Singaporean representatives.214 To a
large extent, this reflects the determination of China to achieve technological
innovation while constructing its own legal hub.

3. Findings on ICCs 3.0
Established in response to a particular regional politico-economic incident
or policy, ICCs 3.0 focus on attracting parties in response to that event or policy
more than simply promoting the home jurisdiction’s dispute resolution market in
general. Thus, ICCs 3.0 often have specific economic, political, or diplomatic
motivations and are regional in nature. Both the post-Brexit ICCs in continental
Europe and the CICC in the Eurasian Belt and Road regions are examples of ICCs
3.0, reflecting the trend of ICC development in response to regional or
geopolitical economic phenomena. The factors that motivate the development of
these ICCs may on the one hand stimulate, or on the other hand hinder efforts to
promote their competitiveness. The top-down, government-initiated approach
could be more effective in achieving geopolitical aims due to the availability of
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national resources like financing and strategic expertise. 215 However, the
underlying politico-economic motivations could instead undermine the
impartiality of the newly established courts, diminishing their attractiveness to
foreign investors. Moreover, compared to ICCs 2.0, ICCs 3.0 are subject to more
constraints from their home countries’ domestic legal systems. As such, the
success of ICCs 3.0 hinges on the extent of their home state’s support. ICCs 3.0
with state support are typically more successful, but those that lose support or
face competing local forces or institutions face more hardships, as in the example
of the failed BIBC.
Although ICCs 3.0 are themselves comparatively less internationalized, the
opportunities prompting their establishment boost their competitiveness. These
ICCs are established in response to new opportunities arising from
politico-economic developments. The European ICCs aim to attract post-Brexit
litigation business, and the CICC hopes to benefit from the prospective volume
of BRI-related litigations. It is possible that these ICCs could develop their
reputations through these unique opportunities. Moreover, ICCs 3.0, following
the evolutions of ICCs 2.0, have also largely incorporated newer features of
international arbitration to make themselves as welcoming as international
arbitration. Table 4 below summarizes the key comparative features of the ICCs
3.0.
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IV. P OWE R D Y NAMIC S
A. The Concept of “Co -Opetition”
The study of the ICCs throughout the globe resonates with that of the
international financial centers. Douglas Arner identified six different types of
financial centers in the world: (i) global, (ii) international, (iii) regional, (iv) niche,
(v) domestic national, and (vi) domestic regional.216 As discussed in Section III.A,
ICCs 1.0 are courts in established jurisdictions (for example, the LCC and NYCD).
In parallel, Arner categorized London and New York as “global” financial centers.
while Hong Kong was identified as an “international” financial center. 217
Singapore, being a hub for the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and Southeast Asian market, is regarded as a “regional” center.218 The
concept of a regional hub mirrors the ICCs 2.0, which are emerging jurisdictions
with a specific geographical focus. The Middle East ICCs, which include the DIFC
Court, QIC, and ADGMC, may fit into the model of “regional” centers given that
they mainly cater to specific Middle East regions (for example, the DIFC zone
and the Qatar Financial Center area). In the meantime, they can fit into the model
of “niche” centers because of their specialized provision of services (for example,
the Islamic finance and Islamic commercial dispute resolution).
Arner’s work also analyzed the intricate relationship among the International
Financial Centers (IFCs), which inspired this Article’s consideration of power
dynamics among the ICCs. Interestingly, the notion of “co-opetition,” which
derives from the two seemingly conflicting concepts “cooperation” and
“competition,” was noted by Arner et al. as an alternative approach to the
dynamics of IFCs.219 In particular, a report on the assessment of Hong Kong as
an IFC explored the issue of “co-opetition” between Hong Kong and Chinese
financial centers such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Beijing.220 After comparing the
various economic performance indicators of the four major financial cities in
China (including the volume of traded shares, the number of listed companies,
and the degree of domestic market capitalization), the report concluded that the
question of whether Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Beijing would draw away equity
investment from Hong Kong simply “misses the point.”221 The true answer to the
question, instead, is that each city will develop its own complementary niche. For
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example, Hong Kong has a particular focus on equities, derivatives, and the
Renminbi (RMB) market, whereas Shanghai focuses more on bonds and wealth
management.222 Besides, even though the four cities are often regarded as having
overlapping strengths in the stock exchange market, the portfolio and variety of
shares available on each stock exchange differ.223 Hence, a rational investor would
optimally maintain a portfolio of shares in each of the stock exchanges to diversify
their investment options.224 In other words, a division of labor and an element of
“complementarity” emerged from the apparent “competition” of the four cities.
Erie has likewise noted that the interaction among the NLHs is one of
“competition and collaboration.”225 Erie’s study of NLHs further explored the
“interhub” and “intrahub” connections.226 While the “interhub connection” refers
to the soft-law linkages between legal hubs along with the recognition and
enforcement of their court judgments,227 the “intrahub connection” refers to the
cross-institutional links between ICCs and arbitration institutions, such as the
DIFC Court’s mechanism to convert its judgments into the LCIA arbitral
awards.228

B. Horizontal Level
To advance the previous studies on IFCs and NLHs, this paper specifies the
two levels or facets of the “co-opetition power dynamics” underlying the global
rise of the ICCs as follows.
The first level is a “horizontal co-opetition” relationship among the ICCs
such that each ICC develops its own complementary niche for the adjudication
business. As demonstrated in the previous section on the three generations of the
ICCs, while all of them deal with complex, high value, and cross-border
commercial cases, they each continuously evolve to develop their own
specializations and distinctive features. This is like the co-opetition development
of the IFCs discussed above.
The evolution of legal infrastructure is especially apparent in the ICCs 2.0
and ICCs 3.0, in which there is either a geographical focus (such as the Middle
East and the ASEAN region) or a geopolitical-economic motivation behind the
establishment (such as the Brexit response and the BRI strategy). There are even
some traces of “metamorphosis” for some ICCs, such as the NYCD’s launch of
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the mandatory pilot scheme or the BIBC’s planned incorporation of features of
both English common law and international soft law (such as the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration) into a traditional civil law
jurisdiction. 229 Even though their functions of adjudicating international
commercial disputes overlap, they have their own niche areas and target user
groups. Hence, they should be treated as service providers for different markets
catering to various users such that there is an implicit division of labor among the
ICCs.
Such a “horizontal co-opetition dynamic” among the ICCs may well become
a new trend for the transnational legal order in the field of international
commercial law. Indeed, there is certainly room for transnational coordination
among states for the respective roles and specializations of ICCs via supranational
or regional platforms, similar to the Conference of Ministers of Justice in the
European Council and the ASEAN Law Ministers Meeting, which aim to deepen
inter-regional coordination in areas such as international commercial law. 230 A
ministerial-level conference among the Ministers of Justice in the BRI region is
one option for coordinating the ICCs along the BRI roadmap; that conference
could include the CICC (in China), the AIFC Court (in Kazakhstan), the SICC (in
Singapore), and the ICCs in the Middle East. Through regular meetings on both
the judicial and ministerial levels, adjustments and fine-tuning could further
differentiate the role of each individual ICC situated in its own geopolitical zone.
That said, the opportunities to differentiate ICCs in horizontal co-opetition
may be limited to ICCs situated in a shared economic zone. As shown in the
findings from a survey report on arbitration, users could be expected to opt for
ICCs that are familiar with the regional business climate and have a mutual judicial
recognition and enforcement arrangement in the region. 231 If that is the case, there
would be less room for differentiation among ICCs that are in the same economic
zone (for example, the European ICCs or the BRI ICCs). This is also the case for
ICCs located in host states that have pre-existing mutual arrangements for
judgment recognition and enforcement. For instance, the latitude for
differentiation among European ICCs may be limited by the existence of the
Brussels Convention on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of commercial
judgments, which applies across the EU member states. The Hague Convention
may provide an additional competitive advantage to its member states over other,
non-member states within the shared economic zone. For example, although
China joined the Hague Convention in 2017, the Chinese legislature has not yet
229
230
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ratified the Convention domestically.232 Thus, the CICC judgments may not enjoy
global mobility. Host states of the AIFC and ICCs in the Middle East have
similarly not yet become parties to the Hague Convention. 233 In contrast,
Singapore both acceded to and ratified the Hague Convention in 2016. 234 Thus,
Singapore will be able to enforce SICC judgments thanks to the Hague
Convention’s facilitation of judgment mobility. The SICC is thus distinguished
from other ICCs within the Asia Pacific Region or the BRI Region (such as the
CICC, AIFC, and Middle East ICCs).

C. Diagonal Level
The second level of the ICC power dynamics is a “diagonal co-opetition”
relationship between the ICCs and international arbitration such that there is both
a trend of judicialization of arbitration and arbitralization of the ICCs.
Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel have observed the “judicialization” of
arbitration institutions, which boosted the legitimacy of international
arbitration.235 Proponents of this theory argue that arbitrators are international
norm-creators by pronouncing transnational arbitral awards. This forms a
self-sustaining empire of “exercising, building, and legitimizing arbitral
authority.”236 Putting the theories into the context of the ICCs, the reverse of
“judicialization”—for example, the “arbitralization” of judiciaries—holds true in
many aspects of the evolution of ICCs.237
Such arbitralization is seen most prominently in ICCs 2.0 and is also present
in the ICCs 3.0. First, the NLHs allow ICCs to assume jurisdiction over disputes
without any link to the host state of the ICC and rely on the Hague Convention
for global judgment mobility to mirror the function of the New York
Convention. 238 Notably, the SICC can assume jurisdiction without any actual
connection with Singapore, although it requires a written jurisdiction agreement
as a connecting factor. 239 As Singapore is an acceding party to the Hague
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Convention, parties to the SICC are entitled to rely on the Hague Convention for
global enforcement before the courts of the member states. 240
Second, there has been a growing willingness for ICCs to allow for judges
with foreign and international law expertise in both common and civil law, a
feature that parallels the ability to select arbitrators with the requisite expertise for
adjudicating disputes. This is particularly evident in ICCs 2.0 like the DIFC, the
QIC, the AIFC Court, and the SICC. Thus, the evolution of ICCs shows a clear
trend of arbitralization by reforming major areas like jurisdiction, enforcement,
and judicial selection to simulate the conditions of international arbitration. The
BIBC proposal was a more experimental development. It explicitly injected the
international soft law on arbitration into a traditional civil law proceeding.241
This Article argues that, despite the seemingly overlapping functions
between the ICCs and international arbitration, there is a complementarity within
the competition. It is a relationship of complementary competition—
“co-opetition.” This element of complementarity is present from both the
“demand” side and the “supply” side of the adjudication market.
A typical example of the design of the “diagonal co-opetition dynamic” lies
in the city of London, where a flagship of dispute resolution services is available
to cater to specific clientele. The combination of the LCC; the LCIA, which
specializes in arbitration; and the Center for Effective Dispute Resolution
(CEDR), which specializes in mediation; forms an agglomerate one-stop legal hub
with differentiated services and functions. 242 Likewise, as discussed above in
Section III.B.3, the agglomeration trinity of the SICC-SIAC-SIMC in Singapore
also reflects the trend of converged legal infrastructure with diverged functions.
The state-led, top-down nature of the agglomeration trinity in Singapore, as well
as the fact that the dispute resolution services (SICC courts, SIAC arbitration,
SIMC mediation) are all located in the same jurisdiction maximizes the diagonal
synergy between the various dispute resolution services. The agglomeration
arrangement thereby neutralizes what would otherwise be a primary advantage of
any international dispute resolution institutions and allows for more internal
cooperation. Moreover, the diversified dispute resolution options would
ultimately benefit the Singaporean government’s state-led synergy as the
“controlling stakeholder” of all three institutions (SICC-SIAC-SIMC), because it
unleashes this synergy of “one-stop-shop” to prospective disputants. 243 As
Michael Hwang, a Singapore senior counsel who served as the former Chief
Justice of the DIFC Court, argued with respect to the SICC, parties seeking to
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resolve disputes in the ICCs are usually users who are dissatisfied with either
international arbitration or the national courts.244 In other words, disputants may
belong to different client pools with various preferences over different desirable
dispute resolution fora.
However, diagonal synergy is limited when dispute resolution institutions do
not share an expressive controlling stakeholder in the same jurisdiction. There
may be an inherent conflict of interest without “centralized” interests, stunting
diagonal synergy.
Considering the adjudication industry holistically, the successful
establishment of a one-stop legal hub can grow the “pie” of the dispute resolution
service market, exemplifying beneficial competition.245 Moreover, a number of the
ICCs have their caseload guaranteed by the case referral paths of host state
domestic courts; examples include the SICC and the CICC, which receive
guaranteed cases from the Singapore High Court and the SPC of China,
respectively.246 This flow of cases is independent from the parties’ choice of court
agreements and is not in direct competition with international arbitration.
In addition, the classic trading center model proposed by Charles
Kindleberger can also shed light on the power dynamics of the ICCs.247 A key
takeaway from the Kindleberger model is that, apart from the established trading
centers such as London and New York, certain centers “emerged essentially as
centres of stability in the context of instability in neighbouring major
economies.”248 Examples include Singapore in Southeast Asia and Dubai in the
Middle East.249 This echoes an observation by Erie, who argues that the ICCs
often emerge where there is a lack of rule of law or where foreign investors doubt
judicial independence.250 Borrowing from this line of argument, the SICC and the
DIFC may be viewed as reliable “stability out of instability” jurisdictional
carve-outs for dispute resolution for the ASEAN economies and the Middle East
region. This is because of the expertise in international law of their benches and
their use of the common law and the English language.
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The phenomenon of arbitralization of the ICCs, which echoes the
convergence of litigation and international arbitration, further reflects the need
for domestic judiciaries to amplify the effect of norm creation by delivering quality
judgments for complex, high-value, cross-border commercial disputes in the
global arena. Indeed, we have seen traces of jurisprudence exporting and
transnational legal order emerging from ICCs themselves. For instance, the SICC
has explicitly pronounced that one of its missions is to “[lay] the groundwork for
a freestanding body of supporting commercial law,” thereby exporting a
transnational commercial law jurisprudence based on its judgments. 251 The
legitimacy of the transnational legal order generated by the ICCs may arguably
transcend the legitimacy of international arbitration, given that a substantial
portion of the ICCs are established within the formal domestic judicial hierarchy,
such as the SICC. The legitimacy boosted by the formal legal structure may allow
the jurisprudence of the same to develop into a modern lex mercatoria, leading to
harmonized legal norms.252 Given that most of the ICCs were established very
recently, it might be too early to judge their impact as an instrument of
transnational legal order. However, it cannot be denied that ICCs 3.0, like the
CICC and the Brexit-induced European ICCs, are politically ambitious because
they have positioned themselves as future legal hubs of governance in specific
geopolitical and geo-economic zones. As such, the issues of governance,
legitimacy, and norm creation alongside the evolution of ICCs will be new
recurrent themes.

V. C ONC LU SION
The emergence of ICCs brings opportunities and challenges to the
adjudication market. This Article has presented a novel and unique typological
framework to study the global ICC power dynamics. It classifies the global ICCs
into three major types: ICCs 1.0 include traditional ICCs in established
jurisdictions (the LCC and the NYCD); ICCs 2.0 cover ICCs in emerging
jurisdictions (the Middle East ICCs, the SICC, and the AIFC Court); and ICCs
3.0 for politico-economically motivated ICCs (the Brexit-led European ICCs and
the BRI-led CICC). This model of typology is built upon scholarship that analyzes
ICCs, not only on the basis of their geographical locations and establishment
history, but also by looking into the politico-economic motives underlying their
establishment.
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On power dynamics, from a “horizontal” level (ICCs inter se), the global
comparative study of ICCs reveals that, although most of them are entrusted with
the power to similarly adjudicate complex commercial cases with a cross-border
element, each ICC has developed its own niche and evolved to cater for different
clientele. On a “diagonal” level (between ICCs and international arbitration), the
global rise of ICCs reflects the convergence between litigation and arbitration,
especially in light of the emergence of “one-stop” integrated dispute resolution
services with ICCs, blending features of arbitration and mediation. With each ICC
providing its own niche service with specialized target markets and users, both the
horizontal and diagonal levels of the power dynamics are characterized by
collaboration, complementarity, or “co-opetition” (an intricate combination
between competition and cooperation). This dynamic is present from both the
supply and demand sides of the adjudication market. In the meantime,
coordination among the ICCs is called for via judicial- or ministerial-level
conferences or international organizations in the geopolitical zone. There is room
for division of labor and specialization to avoid unhealthy competition.
Lastly, in the diagonal level of power dynamics, the “arbitralization” of
judiciaries as a new trend of the transnational legal order has been seen in the
evolution of ICCs. Most ICCs have incorporated elements of arbitration and ADR
into their court procedures to attract adjudication business. The potential for
“co-opetition” between ICCs and international arbitration as a future trend of the
transnational legal order is tremendous. Various ICCs are expected to exert soft
power influence over their regions, reflecting a need to deliver quality ICC
judgments as lex mercatoria in the targeted geopolitical and geo-economic regions.
Although it is difficult to estimate the impact of ICCs on the transnational legal
order given that many of them have only recently been established, the issues of
governance, legitimacy, and norm creation through ICCs will have far-reaching
impacts on international law.
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